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Making and Evaluating Strategy:
Learning from the Military
by
K. Michael Haywood
Associate Professor
School of Hotel and Food Administration
University of Guelph
and
President, Haywood, Bauer and Associates Inc.
Guelph, Ontario, Canada

Use of military analogy is rampant and considered an acceptable part of
business vernacular. However, analogies only illustrate, and bad analogies make bad strategy. There are important lessons to be learned from
military strategy, though. This article identifies "the ten principles of
strategy" that corporate strategists could utilize in testing their strategic
theories, concepts, and plans.

In an industry where services are often associated with being
"kinder and gentler," corporate lingo among hospitality executives
suggests otherwise. Talk in boardrooms and office corridors is
peppered with militaristic terms - wars, battles, offensive and defensive positions. Certainly the competitiveness of the marketplace
favors military metaphors. The success of books such as Ries and
Trout's Marketing Warfare ' is in large part due to the search for the
ultimate corporate weapon and the desire to win the battle against
competitors for customers.
The Burger Wars have become a classic textbook case, and
vestiges of a warlike state exist. Business Week, in its "Industry 1990
Outlook" issue, began an article on the food service industry as
follows:
"Fast Food Joints Are Getting Fried - The Chains Wage
War for Market Share." Grueling times lie ahead for restaurants and fast-food joints. Troubled by labor shortages and a
glut of outlets, they face a bruising price war in 1990. The
first signs of battle already have arrived in the form of
margin-crunching price specials and promotional pyrotechnics. Says Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. CEO John Cranor:
In the next 12 months, we'll all be fighting tooth and tong.'
Military terminology appears to add to an understanding of the
young science of strategy and creates an element of excitement in
what otherwise may be considered a dull subject. However, use of
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such terms and analogies does not prove anything. At best they only,
illustrate and may indeed be misleading.
Of all the analogies which have been politically significant in the
past decade, none has been more important than the attempt to
liken the Soviet threat with that of Nazi Germany. Both regions have
been described as warlike; both are said to share a commitment to
territorial acquisition by means of military expansion, and both are
totalitarian dictatorships. This analogy was propounded by important members of the Reagan Administration, and therefore presumably played some part in how the United States thought of dealing
with the Soviet Union. However, as we now know, the analogy was
flawed. According to Michael Howard, a "militarist" state such as
the Sodet Union invests in huge military efforts, but does so in order
to avoid war, not because it is planning to bring one about. There is
no "cultural" disposition to go to war in the Soviet Union as there
was in the "bellicose" state and hyperviolent culture of Nazi
germ an^.^ However, to those who have what Kissinger calls an
"inherent bad faith" model of the Soviet Union, there is no attempt
to understand such actions from the Soviet point of view; instead,
such behavior is simply categorized according to favored demonic
analogies.
Analogies are one way in which people try to comprehend
complex affairs; however, bad analogies make bad strategy. In the
corporate world, as in the military, devising the best response will
not be assisted by imputing false motives. Strategists can, however,
move beyond military analogies and focus upon "the 10 principles of
strategy" that have been gleaned from studies of the campaigns of
the greatest military commanders. These principles can be used as a
practical checklist to assist sound judgment by the architects and
appraisers of strategic theories, concepts, and plans. However, users
should recognize that no two situations are quite alike, and so the
principles must be applied accordingly.
Ten Principles of Strategy Stand Out
A compelling Darwinian force shapes military strategy. While
those who win battles live and are emulated, losers are only buried.
The military attaches supreme importance to strategy and has
evolved an ethos around it. Officers, during their education and
training, have the 10 principles etched forever in their brains, and
are expected to have read the military classics. In later staff
appointments officers are expected to know the questions and how to
think about them. Strategy becomes their way of life.
The 10 principles that guide officers are used to help identify as
many angles to grandiose schemes purported to solve obstinate
offense and defense problems. They are as follows:"

1. maintenance of morale and commitment
2. maintenance of the aim
3. flexibility
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4. logistic support
5. administration
6. concentration

7. economy of effort
8. offensive action
9. surprise

10. security
It is easy to translate these principles into a corporate context.
In fact, since 1965 a literature on non-military strategy has appeared
in the planning of every institution. However, in universities, where
strategic management is taught, and in businesses, where strategic
management is implemented, the strategic ethos is not always
evident. Professors and managers use the word "strategy," but do not
seem to know what it means. There are many specific problems, but
t h e most important is rejection of t h e systematic method for
analysis. Kenichi Ohmae, in his book The Mind of the Strategist: The
Art of Japanese Business, argues:
Analysis is the critical starting point of strategic thinking.
Faced with problems, trends, events or situations t h a t
appear to constitute a harmonious whole or came packaged
as a whole by the common sense of the day, the strategic
thinker dissects them into their constituent parts. Then,
having discovered the significance of these constituents, he
reassembles them in a way calculated to maximize his
advantage."
Any failure to participate in this habit of.analysis and the 10
principles of strategy became tainted.
Morale and Commitment Must be Maintained
If business and corporate life is anything, i t is a political
endeavor in which leadership is the essence of success. Politics are
about people in institutions struggling against opponents, and war is
politics by other means. In the final analysis, war, whether hot or
cold, resolves itself in a test of wills, not just of armed forces, but of
entire peoples. When the urge to compete is lost, all is lost.
Leadership, discipline, comradeship, self-respect, and unflagging
belief in a cause all help build morale; indeed, tradition holds
military officers solely responsible for it. Unfortunately today, many
hospitality leaders come from backgrounds and institutions in which
morale is not highly regarded. At many universities there is an indifference to morale.
Morale and commitment of the troops do matter. The military
seldom asks why, but if the idea needs support, the literature is
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vast. During the Vietnam war, for example, military and government leaders so focused on the illusion of winning the war that
political deception and its attendant cynical revelations became
widespread. For example, just before the Tet offensive in 1968, top
military officers and their civilian representatives deliberately
distorted intelligence estimates of enemy troops in order to gain
political goals. The troops in the field were unaware of these
deceptions, a s apparently were many high ranking military
officers. Consequently, the military was caught off guard by the
fury and success of the Vietcong offensive. Such situations hardly
instill rank-and-file confidence in leadership.
In the military, as in business, the challenge is to get everybody
to identify and adopt the values and goals of the organization. This
requires involvement; that is, everybody must be immersed psychologically in the activities of individual roles a t work. Moreover,
employees must feel a sense of loyalty or affection for and attachment to the organization.
Strategic excellence is based on an organization's ability to affect
its employees favorably, to enhance their intellectual and skillrelated abilities, and to make a positive difference in their lives. Just
as businesses work hard to build value into the products and services
produced and sold, value must be added to employees if they are to
be effective in their work and in providing service to customers. This
philosophy of caring demands that organizations focus their energies
and that all internal constituencies work toward a common goal the development of human resources.
Maintenance of the Aim is Paramount

All men can see the tactics where I conquer, but what none
can see is the strategy out of which great victory is evolved:
Sun-tzu.'
Strategic aim from a military point of view refers to some
measure or some degree of control over the enemy, either in terms
of overcoming their forces or their will to fight. With political,
economic, and social factors impinging on military strategy,
however, it is necessary to provide a common and basic frame of
reference for armed forces personnel, politicians, economists, and
philosophers in their common efforts toward a common aim. Effective military strategies, therefore, state an unambiguous onesentence aim, the brevity of which conceals an agony of subjective
analysis. I t i s a single-minded s t a t e m e n t of values which
subsumes all tactical choices. The aim is not an object; it is an
image. Explicitly it says what the military is endeavoring to do.
Implicitly it defines the game. Unless the aim is maintained in
planning and tactical execution, the strategy will crumble. As
most military people will admit, the essence of a general's job is to
assist in developing a clear sense of purpose, to keep the junk from
getting in the way of important things.
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Contrary to the beliefs of the noted war historian Karl von
Clausewitz, that strategy simply is "the use of engagements to
attain the object of war"; the situation today is different. "The true
aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so
advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its
continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this."' This idea is not
new. Sun-tzu recognized t h a t "to subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill.""
Developing a single-minded aim for a corporate strategy is a
vital necessity, stemming from the fundamental yet evolutionary
threat of being crowded out by competitors, and unsuspectedly by
non-traditional competitors utilizing new technology. In the biological world, survival of the fittest has always focused on differentiation. Strategic theorists, such as Michael Porter, are of a similar
mind.Vifferentiation on the basis of price, product function, time
or place utility, or simply the creation of a n image that effects
customer perceptions is important. However, creating value for
customers and developing a compelling competitive advantage is
insufficient to ensure long-term organizational survival. There
must be a sharing of and commitment to specific corporate values
and dominant beliefs.
Disney Specifies Values
Disney Corporation is a prime example of a company with a
strong culture which, through its legendary president, specifies its
beliefs and values for all its employees. Disney's beliefs can be found
not only in its orientation booklets, but in the hearts and minds of its
devoted employees. There are three strong beliefs: respect for the
individual, customer service, and excellence. Beyond these beliefs,
Disney also issues a set of hndamental principles to guide employee
conduct. These principles deal with such issues as managerial talent,
technological development, employee development, stockholder return,
and social responsibility. In fact, Walt Disney suggested that these
beliefs and principles were more responsible for the company's success
than its technological and economic resources or its organizational
structure, innovation, and timing. They also constitute absolutes in
the sense that whatever else may change, they remain constant.
In the military as in business, shared values and beliefs must be
reinforced. Disney employees daily learn what is appropriate and
what is not. Through their actions and decisions, they know how
much autonomy they can carve out within the confines of the corporate value system, one that is intent on capturing the essence of
winning, one that in its stability over time provides consistency to
short-term action and sets a target that deserves personal effort and
commitment.
A good strategy is rigid in its values, and flexible in its expression. Purposes, policies, plans, and procedures inevitably change.
This leads to the basic promise enunciated by Admiral Joseph Wylie:
"No one can predict with certainty the pattern war will take.""
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There is a need for alternate solutions to potential problems,
which must be addressed according to their character, immanency,
importance, and probability of occurrence:
The player who plans for only one strategy runs a great risk
simply because his opponent soon detects the (deficiency) and counters it. The requirement is for a spectrum of strategies that are flexible and noncommittal, a theory that by
intent and design can be applied in unforeseen situations.
Planning for uncertainty is not as dangerous as it might
seem; there is, after all, some order in military as well as
other human affairs. But planning for certitude is the
greatest of all mistakes."
In the hospitality industry, physical facilities afford less margin
for flexibility than intellectual ideas. Deciding where to place
material emphasis is a matter of considerable consequence, determined by assigning priorities. Whatever the verdict, it should be
imaginative. Triteness in the field of strategy is a deadly sin.
Experience and observation suggest a n unhealthy rigidity
among many corporate strategists. Failing to realize that neither
opportunities nor crises can be commanded, they dwell too much on
strategic plans. Failures in corporate planning are puzzling, for a
corporate or a business plan has much in common with a military
operation order. Once an operation begins, its plan rapidly disintegrates as opportunities and misfortunes emerge. So a corporate or
business plan should disintegrate, but in a different time frame. The
military commander expects this, and soon abandons the plan, but
not its underlying strategy.
In business as on the battlefield, the object of strategy is to
bring about the conditions most favorable to one's own side,
judging precisely the right moment to attack or withdraw
and always assessing the limits of compromise correctly.
Besides the habit of analysis what marks the mind of the
strategist is a n intellectual elasticity or flexibility that
enables him to come up with realistic responses to changing
situations not simply to discriminate with great precision
among different shades of grey."
Logistic Support and Administration Provide Resource
Napolean Bonaparte is reputed to have said, "An army marches
on its stomach." Logistics and administration are the principles that
provide many of the resources that strategy puts to work. As any top
commander will admit, no battles can be won unless soldiers can
hold and gain ground in war. During World War I1 this meant a
ground Army supported by tactical aviation with supply lines
guarded by the Navy. Logistics - the provision, movement, and
maintenance of all services and resources necessary to sustain
military forces - is, therefore, inseparable from administration, the
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management of all services and resources necessary to sustain
military forces.
Strategy must be activated, not just preached. In other words,
nothing happens until resources are committed, and for an ongoing
strategy, disintegration may occur unless there is continuity in the
commitment of resources. Resource allocation, however, is of
immense complexity. It faces three dilemmas: deciding what c&teria
to use, matching resource needs with resource availability, and
scheduling resource commitment over time. Moreover, as technical
innovation continues to improve the capability for waging war, the
challenge to political and military command in resolving these
dilemmas intensifies. According to one U.S. official:
Decisions will be made by computers that have been taught
(i.e., programmed) all that humans know about war as they
hypothesize it will be fought with modern weapons. The
computer will perhaps have expanded upon that knowledge.
Humans will oversee and override rather than execute. War
will not only be come as you are but will also be preprogrammed.13
While perhaps excessively sanguine about the use of computers
in the larger direction and management of combat, the big question
facing both the military and business is whether current or foreseeable systems (human, institutional, and technological) for the
management of operations will be equal to the growing challenges in
information and management systems.
Information Determines Strategy
What makes information systems of supreme importance is
primarily the fact that the effectiveness of strategy is now determined by information.14Whether the problem relates to allocating
resources, improving the conduct of operation, or handling management crises, competitive battles are won or lost on the basis of the
adequacy of information. What is changing is that the stakes in
many of these strategic issues are now much higher. Also the scope
and tempo of these issues may be such that neither the commander
or manager will have an opportunity to remedy errors they make
due to poor information.
The information revolution in both business and military
spheres leaves the erroneous impression, though, that information
technology has solved the age-old problems of fog of decision making
which arise when tactical or strategic information is disregarded,
incomplete, unconfirmed, deceptive, untimely, unavailable, contradictory, or misinterpreted. To the contrary, however, in the potentially information-soaked environment of the modern battlefield or
corporation, fog of decision making is often an even greater problem.
Information overload, dysfunctional information, internal failure
modes, and availability of people to operate and maintain the equipment suggest that attention be increasingly focused on both the
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protection of information systems a t the tactical and strategic levels
and on ways of countering such protection.
The challenges posed by the information revolution and the
advent of information warfare are vexing indeed, compounded by
how management systems operate in the context of ongoing competition for influence or market domination. Of particular importance in
the military are questions regarding the. ability to escalate use of
force or threat of force as distinct from launching or repelling a n
attack. In such situations there is a recognized need to move beyond
technology to look a t human and institutional questions. For
example, the following framework which applies equally to the
military and to business suggests that when evaluating strategic
decisions, attention should be paid to the following aspects of the
management of operations:
Interactions: corporate unit interactions, functional interactions, service interactions, alliance interactions, competitor
interactions
Functional elements: marketing and sales, customer service,
operational control, financing and accounting, communications
and data transmission, surveillance and intelligence collection
Components: institutional, human, technical, procedural
Dimensions: regional, national, international
Scenarios and contingencies: type of attack or strategic
problem, length of encounter - limited, episodic, prolonged
Phases: pre-conflict, onset, peak, and resolution of conflict
Substantive: decision making, decision execution
System qualities: adaptability, reliability, responsiveness,
resistance, survivability, durability, capacity and comprehensiveness
Areas of concern: Same as system qualities but dependent on
scenario and contingencies within scenario, as well as vulnerabilities to external disruption or internal failure mode
Idiosyncratic factors: Impact of individual, institutional or
national culture, tradition, experience and technological or
strategic styles on the design and operation of management
systems

While each of these aspects merits attention, there is no suggestion that they are of equal importance. Although there is clearly
room for refinement, most of the basic aspects mentioned are sufficiently commonplace or self-explanatory as to need little justification;
however, the role each plays in the management of strategy implementation is perhaps less obvious.
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Economy of Effort and Concentration Complete Strategy
To engage the typical military or business organization's
fragmented approach to the identification and implementation of
strategy, logistical support and administration must be associated
with two more principles, economy of effort and concentration.
Together these four principles provide a framework for priority
setting, commitment of resources, alliance building, and political
trade-offs. Furthermore, they demand a perspective reaching beyond
purely internal organizational issues.
Successful execution of strategy in business a s well a s war
demands concentrating the proper combination of effort and resources
a t the proper time and place to accomplish decisive aims. In war
proper, application of this principle in conjunction with the other
principles may permit numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive
combat superiority. However, primary stress must be devoted to top
priority projects and the most serious threats, external or internal. The
side with the initiative enjoys a huge advantage, since it can focus its
energy on known objectives, while the opposition must dissipate its
power in preparing for contingencies.
Available resources, whether human, material, or monetary,
never are unlimited. Concentration at points of decision, however,
implies the need for economy elsewhere. This can be achieved in two
ways: by allotting minimum essential efforts and resources to those
endeavors that require least emphasis, or by temporarily diverting
strengths from selected high-priority areas, recognizing that this
involves calculated risks. In the military, the former method is most
frequently used, but both call for canny judgment.
The risks associated with economy of force place a premium on
flexibility of thought and action. Economy of force missions may
require limited attack, defense, cover and deception, or retrograde
actions. In other words, a reserve of strategies is required if the
situation changes or when a war fails to proceed in accordance with
the plan in use.
For the military or corporate strategist, specific encounters or
situations should be taken up only after logistic, material, and other
resource requirements have been ascertained. This is a process in
which the estimation of needs and costs should be based on less
favorable situations and tempered by judgments as to probabilities
as well as hazards.
Game theory is of particular value in this regard and has helped
sharpen preparedness plans. For example, the business that plans
for only one strategy runs a great risk simply because its competitors
may detect the single strategy and counter it. The requirement is for
a spectrum of strategies that are flexible and non-committal, a
theory that by intent and design can be applied in unforeseen situations. Planning for uncertainty is not as dangerous as it might seem;
there is, after all, some order in military and business affairs. And,
as any military historian will tell you, planning for certitude is the
greatest of all military mistakes.
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Offensive Action Is Critical
Most hospitality firms have never looked beyond a purely defensive posture, which at best can only gain time to organize a countermove. Without offense, defense is incremental failure because it only
comprises a response or reaction to the move of and the terms set by
the competitor. Offensive operations, on the other hand, are the most
effective way to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, and with it the
freedom of action to pursue prescribed aims In war, offensive action
permits the commander to exercise initiative and impose his will on
the opposition to engage them a t times and places of his choosing and
in manners he desires, to exploit enemy weakness and rapidlychanging situations, and to react to unexpected developments.
Defensive action may be forced on a commander as a temporary
expedient while awaiting an opportunity for offensive action, or may
be adopted deliberately for the purpose of economizing forces on a
front when a decision is not sought. Even on the defensive, the
commander must seek opportunities to seize the initiative and
achieve decisive results through offensive action. The defense must
be active, not passive.
Military strategy places a premium on intellectual offensives as
well as physical action. This applies particularly to business. Active
striving for innovative ideas, diplomatic assaults, incessant searches
for technological break-throughs, and concerted efforts to capture
people's minds are a few alternative but highly effective initiatives initiatives that will force competitors to react rather than act.
Surprise Means Not Being Surprised
To companies like Holiday Inn, the principle of surprise means
not being surprised. To the military, not being surprised means
vigilance a n d reserves. Businesses t r a n s l a t e vigilance into
research and information, but the need for resources violates the
principle of efficiency, a basic tenet of economics.
From a more offensive posture, surprise results from striking
a competitor a t a time andlor place and in a manner for which he
is unprepared, or fails to grasp the full significance too late to
react effectively. Surprise, aided and abetted by various combinations of secrecy, effective intelligence, speed, cover, deception,
originality, and audacity, can shift the balance of power decisively,
paving the way for victories far out of proportion to the efforts
expanded.
Strategic surprise can assume many forms; conventional
military or corporate surprise involving recognizable forces and
well-understood procedures may worry competitors t h e least.
Other approaches can have even greater strategic consequence if
conditions are ripe. Militarily, the psychological surprise of Hanoi's
1968 Tet offensive unseated President Johnson and precipitated
widespread pacificism in the United States. Technological surprise
can be equally devastating. The strategic implications of Sputnik
I, for example, were unsurpassed. With regard t o all these
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surprises, however, strategic success is not ensured, but they
vastly increase the odds in favor of those who utilize them.
Security Involves Protecting Management
The last strategic principle is security, the imperative to protect
the core from catastrophe a t the perimeter. The vital core in
businesses varies, though it contains the institutional structures and
human resources that enhance the corporate entity. Security, therefore, results from the measures taken by management to protect
itself from espionage, observation, sabotage, harassment, or surprise.
It is a condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures against hostile acts or influences."
Counter-intelligence contributes to that goal by pinpointing
possible sabotage and subversion and diluting enemy espionage
efforts. Positive intelligence programs provide critical information
concerning competitors' capabilities and intentions, thereby guarding
against surprise. Security, therefore, preserves power and reduces
the probability that competitor activity, direct or indirect, might
interfere unduly with vital friendly interests, assets, plans, or operations. By reducing vulnerabilities, security increases freedom of
action. Since risk is inherent in war, application of the principle of
security does not imply undue caution or the avoidance of calculated
risk. A good offense often is an outstanding defense. Seizing and
retaining the initiative can interrupt inimical activity.
Utilization of the 10 principles of strategy implies that the
making of strategy is a natural process. Yet no strategic decision
maker is usually natural all the time. This conundrum can be
explained by suggesting that strategy is pursued at two levels. First,
it is pursued at the purely natural level at which attention is focused
on reasonable and conscious behavior by the cold calculations of
interests, and, second, it is pursued at a level which examines the
participants in competition or conflict with regard to conscious and
unconscious behavior, and with regard to psychological motivations
as well as logical calculations.
The first kind of analysis assumes a strategic person who
evaluates every conceivable action in terms of a costlgain analysis.
That is typical of a kind of strategic reasoning which assumes both
rationality and complete knowledge of the value systems of all
parties in conflict. The 10 strategic principles are part of this
assumption because they highlight the logic of situations and
strategies. But when it comes to deciding strategy, the intellectual
constraint of the strategic person is forced to make way for a more
human individual, and strategies have to be designed to take
account of this human unreasonableness. With luck and good
judgment, military and corporate power can be successfully
managed. Application of these principles is a step forward in
realizing this dream.
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